Albanians Fighting in Syria: Xhemati Alban in 2020 – Part 1

This article is the first of a four part series where we will focus on the weapons seen in the propaganda of Xhemati Alban, an ethnic Albanian insurgent group operating in Syria, published in 2020.

Introduction

Xhemati Alban is a small group that claims to be composed of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia and the Presevo Valley (Serbia). The name “Xhemati Alban” translates to “Albanian group” or “جماعة الألبان” and is a mixture of Arabic “Alban” (which refers to their area of origin, Albania and/or their ethnicity; and of Albanian “Xhemati” which translates to “Group”.

The group claims to have been established in 2012, but reports suggest that the group only started operations in 2017[1] (the earliest known piece of propaganda of the group has been dated to be from October 2017[2]). They claim to have taken part in the fighting for Ras al-Ayn (aka. Serê Kaniyê‎), Abu al-Duhur Airbase, Jisr al-Shughur and other scenes of fighting. In 2020 they have been operating and/or fighting in Latakia (in the area of Kabani), southeastern Idlib and western Aleppo.

The group is headed by Abu Qatada al-Albani (Abdul Jashari), born in 1976 in Skopje former Yugoslavia (today, North Macedonia)[3], he was appointed by then Jabhat al-Nusra leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani as military leader of the Islamic Emirate in the Levant in 2014[4]. The Islamic Emirate appears to be a form of government, which has been announced as response to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s announcement of the “Islamic State in Syria and Iraq” (Dawlah Islamiyah fi al-Sham fi al-Rafidayn)[5]. The term Levant or [al-]Sham is meant to describe an area of greater Syria which roughly corresponds with the current countries of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestinian Territories and depending on the source also parts of Iraq, Cyprus and the Sinai pininsula[6]. In late 2016, al-Albani was added by the U.S. Department of Treasury to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List because of his links to Jabhat al-Nusra[3]. He is also reported to be a close military advisor to the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) Abu Mohammad al-Jolani [2].

Xhemati Alban appears to be closely aligned with HTS, they, with other foreign fighter groups, have released a joint statement announcing support for HTS and their policy[7]. The areas in which they operate in Latakia and especially Aleppo are under control of HTS, which makes at least tactical coordination likely. Also one of their training sites lies very close to a site used by HTS and another training site they used has also been used by a HTS sub-group.

Their exact allegiances are unknown, but as their leader is close to HTS they may be a covertly controlled sub-group of HTS, similar to Jund al-Aqsa. To diversify their control over the oppositions Jabhat al-Nusra let some of their members leave and form a seemingly independent group which was still under control of Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN), which coordinated and fought together with JaN [8].

This group specializes in using snipers and light weapons (recoilless rifles and automatic grenade launchers), they operated in the majority in Latakia but they conducted some limited operations in southeastern Idlib and Aleppo. They are very proficient at employing light weapons and their snipers have demonstrated deep operational knowledge. They also appear to have good funding as their weapons and equipment seems standardized to a degree and their media capabilities are on a high level (both as in having access to knowledgeable people in terms of media productions and the necessary equipment).

As part of the research for this article the author estimated the size of the group. The estimation is based on the propaganda released by the group. A total of 75 unique persons (unique has been defined as the following: could not be identified to be a person who appeared previously in their media) could be documented, one third of them operated light weapons (SPG-9 and AGS-17) or were snipers. The other two thirds were either manning positions at the front or their occupation within the group could not be determined. The highest number of Xhemati Alban members at one place which could be documented were 24 (excluding one child which was also present), during Iftar (the evening meal during Ramandan, during which many Muslim fast during the day). Although the exact size of the group is unknown the author estimates their size to be 60-90 (combatants, likely more [media personnel] and non-combatants such as their religious scholar, and the fighters’ families), with one third to one fourth of being members specialized in using sniper rifles or light weapons.

The main part of the group is dedicated to manning frontline positions. It is not known if they also conduct light infantry attacks, they have previously shown footage from an light infantry attack but that footage was several years old (before Xhemati Alban started operations), currently such attacks appear unlikely as they lack the manpower to conduct operations independently but may participate in wider operations by other groups.

The group appears to be organized into three fighting elements – first, the fighters who man the frontline positions, secondly the fighters who conduct light weapons attacks and thirdly the snipers. The fighters manning the frontline positions are organized into 5-10 groups who hold specific fortified sections of the frontline. The light weapons teams seem to sometimes be embedded with the fighters manning the frontline but otherwise appear to act independently. The snipers have not been seen embedding with other fighters of the group on the frontline. The only two times they have shown their sniper operations, they were independent deployments, once to the front in Aleppo (to attack pro-Regime personnel) and the other time a location in Latakia (to attack an pro-Regime position). Generally both the snipers and the light weapons operators operate in two man groups, the sniper team is comprised of a sniper and a spotter (have been seen to look for targets, does the ballistic calculations and relays intelligence to the sniper), and the light weapons team is comprised of the operator and an additional person who mainly helps with transporting the weapon and ammunition.

For more information about their members the following is the history of one of their fighters who was killed in mid-2019 by pro-Regime forces (likely in the province of Hamma), his death has been confirmed by Kosovo authorities[9]. His name was Rron Emini who’s kunya (nome-de guerre) had been “Muhamed Albani”, he had been born either in 1996 or in 1997 in Pristina, Kosovo and appears to have been an ehtnic Albanian. He then reportedly left Kosovo in 2016 with four other jihadists and moved to Syria[10]. This is consistent with propaganda in which he appeared. At the time of his death it was wrongly reported that he had been a member of the so-called “Islamic State” which is incorrect he had been a member of Xhemati Alban.

Small Arms

All the handguns shown in their propaganda were 9×18mm chambered Marakov-pattern pistols, all with a Fab Defense PM-G grip. The Fab Defense grip enables easier reloads of the pistol and is popular with the foreign fighters in Syria who have enough funding to afford it. One of the Makarovs which has been extensively shown and appeared in a recent photo release by the group, features like all the other Makarovs documented, a Fab Defense PM-G grip but also an interesting paint-job in a pattern similar to Multicam black, done by a well-known local artist who does many paint-jobs, mainly for foreign fighters. The holsters of the Makarov pistols are also made by Fab Defense, they were Fab Defense Scorpus M1 Level holsters. Fab Defense furniture and accessories are common to see AK-series of self-loading rifles and Makarovs self-loading pistols being upgraded with in the Middle East in general and in Syria in particular. 

Pistols, however, seem to be relatively rare amongst the members of this group. Most of the pistols observed were in possession of members with generally better individual equipment than other members of the group. This may mean that they finance their equipment with an individual source of income which doesn’t come from the group itself. Foreign fighters in Syria, especially the German foreign fighters in Idlib have established a source of income to found their activities, which comes from donations from their home countries. With at least some publicly using that income to source better equipment for themselves and sometimes other fighters. To justify this they use religious teachings for example  “Everyone who spends [money] in the way of Allah will have it multiplied 700 times.” and “Anyone who has equipped a fighter for the sake of Allah has actually fought”[11]. The context of the second message is that this way people can participate in “Jihad” too without leaving to fight in Syria. Another source of income for individuals and groups are charities, there are some charities who support armed groups, like the Abu Ahmed Foundation who supported HTS-linked groups [12].

References

[1] عنجريني, ص., 2014. الجولاني يعلن «إمارة الشام» وأبو قتادة الألباني سيقود جيشها | الجمل بما حمل | نضع أخبار العالم بين يديك ونأتيك بـ الجمل بما حمل قبل أن يرتد طرفك إليك فقط انقر على aljaml.com. [online] Aljaml.com. Available at: <https://aljaml.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%20%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86%20%C2%AB%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%85%C2%BB%20%D9%88%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88%20%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%20%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%88%D8%AF%20%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%A7>

[2] Shtuni, A., 2019. Western Balkans Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Jihadis: Trends and Implications – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. [online] Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Available at: <https://ctc.usma.edu/western-balkans-foreign-fighters-homegrown-jihadis-trends-implications/>

[3] Home.treasury.gov. 2016. Counter Terrorism Designations and Updates | U.S. Department of the Treasury. [online] Available at: <https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20161110>

[4]عنجريني, ص., 2014. «النصرة» لم تمت بعد: الجولاني يعلن «إمارة الشام». [online] al-akhbar. Available at: <https://al-akhbar.com/Syria/34597>

[5] حسن, أ., 2014. إمارة الشام الإسلامية: استراتيجية النصرة في مواجهة الخلافة. [online] عربي21. Available at: <https://arabi21.com/story/761956/%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A9>

[6] Freeradiopeace.com. n.d. Levant, the core of the Middle East. [online] Available at: <https://freeradiopeace.com/levant.html>

[7] عنب بلدي. 2020. مقاتلون مهاجرون في إدلب يؤيدون تولي “تحرير الشام” إدارة المنطقة | عنب بلدي. [online] Available at: <https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/394397>

[8] Lister, C., 2016. The Syrian Jihad. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[9] Tetova Sot. 2019. Ky është Rron Emini, shqiptari nga Kosova që u vra në Siri. [online] Available at: <https://www.tetovasot.com/2019/05/ky-eshte-rron-emini-shqiptari-nga-kosova-qe-u-vra-ne-siri/>

[10] Kmnovine.com. 2019. Syria, Kosovo’s terrorist killed by Assad’s army. [online] Available at: <https://www.kmnovine.com/2019/05/syria-kosovos-terrorist-killed-by.html?m=1>

[11] Propaganda posted by German foreign fighters.

[12] Soliev, N., 2020. Charity for “Jihad” in Syria: The Indonesian-Uyghur Connection | RSIS. [online] Rsis.edu.sg. Available at: <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/charity-for-jihad-in-syria-the-indonesian-uyghur-connection/#.YDgE2ehKick>

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