Breaking news story from Hadera, Israel: Two IS in Israel operatives carried out a lethal attack on police officers last night, March 27th, in northern Israel.
Matthew Fishback
Iranian Small Arms in Somalia and the Horn of Africa
Since 2015 there have been at least 12 documented arms seizures off the Somalian and Yemeni coastlines by US, Saudi, and a variety of other navies. These weapons seizures range in size from 10s of rifles to hundreds of Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) and thousands of Type 56-1 AKs.
U.S. 5th Fleet Seizure of Arms in the North Arabian Sea
On December 20, 2021, the US Navy’s 5th Fleet intercepted a stateless dhow in the North Arabian Sea carrying arms and ammunition. This was the third interception made by the 5th Fleet during 2021, of dhow carrying SALW towards Yemen with its origin likely being Iran. Notably, this is the first instance of ammunition being found by the 5th Fleet this year.
Pre-State Israeli ‘Revolver’ Ammunition
In the pre-State era of Israel’s existence, it has been well covered both here at Silah Report and elsewhere, that various Jewish armed groups addressed their extreme lack of materiel through clandestine methods. This short article covers one of the interesting ways the pre-State forces supplied ammunition for the wide range of small arms in service.
Israel’s 7.62×51 Tear Gas Ammo
Israeli-made 7.62×51mm tear gas ammo has been available on the US commercial market for a number of years but its exact origins have remained a mystery. In this article we explore what we know, and don’t know, about IMI tear gas ammo.
Six Day War Tactics and Equipment: Sinai Front
Israel’s infantry tactics had changed drastically since the 1955 Suez Crisis, in which Army Chief of Staff Mosha Dayan focused almost entirely on traditional infantry and airpower, neglecting armor and logistics. The British and French had significant success with armored assaults on Egyptian forces during the Crisis. This proved to Dayan that a strong mechanized infantry and armor corps would be the key to success for Israel in the inevitable future warfare over Sinai. Finkel and other commentators refer to this as the “cult of armored warfare”, which neglected defense for offensive capability entirely.[1] By the time the 6 Day War began, in 1967, Israel’s forces were better equipped but no more well trained than the army had previously been. This would prove to be a major issue.