Afghanistan – Page 4 – Silah Report

U.S. M16A4 Reportedly Among Iranian Protests

January 8, 2018 by Miles

A Twitter account by the name of Tehran. azady/@Gloomily8 (Free Tehran) has posted two posts and accompanying photographs on their page depicting what appears to be an FN Herstal, former U.S. Government 5.56x45mm M16A4 Service Rifle. It is not known or confirmed if the image is actually from Tehran for that matter, but a cursory Google Image Search revealed this Twitter account appears to have been the first online poster of this particular photograph. It would also appear that these photographs are actually screenshots from a motion picture, due to the apparent movement of the light source.

Neither post makes much mention of the weapon and is more concentrated on what is going to be happening or will be planned to happen in the future in regards to the protests.

Notice the SKU imprint-

It would appear that this M16A4 is most likely diverted from U.S. Foreign Military Sales to Iraq. What could possibly confirm this is the design of the handguard. We know it is an M16A4 due to the M1913 Picatinny Rail a part of the upper receiver, of which an “A2” carrying handle is fastened to. What is being left out however, is the design of the handguard. If it is a Knight’s Armament “A4” handguard, it would be a very rare sight indeed. But most likely it is an “A2” style with the circular handguards and vertical vent ports. The “Hybrid” M16A4/A2 rifles were previously sold to the Iraqi Army-

And were subsequently seen/captured by the so-called Islamic State-

Source- Conflict Armament Research Report

Source- http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2749197/ISIS-arming-US-military-hardware-wage-jihad-Middle-East-seizing-weapons-Syrian-rebels-Iraqi-soldiers.html

It should be noted that M16A4s are in service in Afghanistan with the Ministry of the Interior, in addition to M4/M4A1s are in service with numerous Afghan forces as well. But the amount in service in Afghanistan doesn’t seem to be proportional to the amount of M16A4s with the Iraqi Army, or circulating on the Iraqi black market.

Source- https://www.khaama.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Afghan-special-forces.jpg

Book Review: The Afghan Way of War

October 11, 2017 by Miles

Although former British Army officer Robert Johnson wrote his book, “The Afghan War of War” in 2011, his conclusions and observations are just as valuable, if not more valuable today than ever. The premise of his book is that very few authors, officers, or politicians have throughly studied the Afghan side of many of the conflicts that have taken place in Afghanistan, whether it be Afghans against foreign invaders/occupiers, or civil war within the country such as during the 1990s. What I especially liked about the book was a number of very useful points that Johnson raises, that I honestly had not thought of before. I’ll summarize some of these points below, as these were my key takeaways from the book.

A Nation of a Thousand Tribes

Johnson goes to great lengths to make the point that Western observers have seen Afghans as “unchanging”, the “Graveyard of Empires”, and “fierce tribal fighters”, and this has stereotyped impressions of the Afghans since the first Anglo-Afghan War in the 1840s. Throughout the book we have countless counter-examples where this doesn’t seem to be the case. Where Afghan tactics have changed, altered, and have been reactive to the threats faced, in addition to being proactive and forcing Western troops to be constantly on the defensive.

But there is one constant that hasn’t changed, and that is the tribal and group dynamics that have existed for several hundred years. What we see is that instead of seeing Afghanistan as a single entity, or even an ethnic group as an entity, what is really going on is hundreds of individual tribes, sub-tribes, clans, and families that are essentially looking out for the best option for their individual group. Whether they ally with the British, or with the King, whether the Mullahs decide to go to war at all, whether peace is on the table, etc… Any of these decisions are made for the benefit of the particular group (tribe, clan, village, etc…). And these often change. What is beneficial for a village one month, may be detrimental for it the next. This means that to the British, Soviets, or Americans, it can be increasingly frustrating trying to maintain alliances and agreements.

Something that Johnson doesn’t mention, but a personal observation that I’ve made is how economy plays into these decisions. The lack of a stable exportation or cultivation of any natural resource (other than crops and opium) has been a limiting detractor throughout the countries history and still affects national security today. But when local tribes and villages can’t rely on natural resources like oil, mining, etc… the need to fight tooth and nail for alliances, positions, and funds becomes even more apparent.

Foreign Invaders Unify Afghans

In the example of every invading or occupying force, one of the constant themes is that one of the only forces that has ever truly united Afghans of different ethnic origins in some fashion has been the need to expel a foreign one. Johnson doesn’t point this out explicitly but this is evident in his descriptions of the country before several conflicts. The state of the country under the King appeared to be on the brink of falling apart on numerous occasions, when senior leadership pushed for further hostilities against the British or during the time of communism, against the Soviets. Even under the Taliban during OEF, the need to unite under an Islamic banner instead of an Afghan, or Pashtun one was strategically necessary to be able to sweep tribal differences aside.

Differences in Technology

The first Anglo-Afghan War saw the widespread use of muzzleloading rifles and muskets on both sides of the conflict, with the British armed with the Brown Bess, and the Afghans with the Jezail muzzle loading rifle. Apart from the British cannon and cavalry, the two forces were somewhat equal in terms of actual hardware.

However in the second Anglo-Afghan War this dynamic dramatically changed with the introduction of breech-loading rifles that could not only be reloaded quicker, fired faster, but also more accurately and further. This changed the way Afghan tribesmen attacked British columns. They had to close in faster, not allowing the British to use their artillery, and often attacked at night.

Similarly, in the war against the Soviets, the use of Stinger MANPODS was brought up. The popular misconception is that Stingers helped win the war. Although they did strike fear among Soviet helicopter pilots, especially the Hind attack helicopters, their introduction was too late to make a difference in 1986, when the Soviet Union had already decided to being fighting a delaying action instead of an all-out offensive. In addition, by altering their flying practices to fly at higher altitudes, the Soviets realized they could go outside of the Stinger’s capabilities and lessen the risk.

In Operation Enduring Freedom, the prevalence of IEDs took precedence over light Infantry attacks that the Taliban initially tried to use against the British in Helmand, but suffered costly casualties due to the artillery and air assets. IEDs used by the Taliban deserve to be studied much more in detail due to the complex escalation’s and counter escalation’s executed on each other throughout the entire campaign.

Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Herrick Observations

One point I think the book could have been improved on is the OEF/Op Herrick. In retrospect, this isn’t really Johnson’s fault because the war is still ongoing, and he can’t have access to many of the after action reports, or even just the massive amount of experience associated with the current operations from hundreds of thousands of veterans and currently serving troops. He picks out specific situations and TTPs that are usually from the British perspective, that doesn’t typify what other forces might have faced in their fight against the Pashtun lead Taliban insurgency.

His conclusion though is flawless in that he identifies that any considerable gains going forward will have to be an Afghan solution to an Afghan problem. Personally I think this has to have enormous emphasis on the countries economy, and being able to become prosperous on exporting natural resources already present in order to actually provide some capitol for a government entirely propped up on international aid money.

The Afghan Way of War is available on Amazon for $35.95.

Analysis of Taliban Firing Positions in OEF

October 2, 2017June 27, 2017 by Miles

Due to the efforts of ISAF forces during Operation Enduring Freedom, Taliban fighters had to change their tactics constantly to stay tactically ahead of coalition efforts. Because of the reliance on fire support assets and modern armament that much of ISAF could afford, the Taliban in Helmand and Kandahar provinces couldn’t sustain a protracted fight as they could against ANA or AUP positions. Thus the insurgent force had to adapt and overcome. One of the ways in which they employed small arms against ISAF forces was through their usage of compounds and firing positions. Being in Helmand or Kandahar, firing from an open position or fields is almost certainly suicide against ISAF forces because of the lack of egress routes and being cut down. Thus, many Taliban fighters adopted the technique of utilizing “murder holes” as firing positions from compounds. Most of these compounds were taken over from the families that owned them, often threatening them with death if they spoke to coalition forces about the compound’s usage.

Compound/housing structures in rural southern Afghanistan have a number of advantages for maneuver insurgent warfare. Because the walls are made from mud, they can have holes busted through them to use as firing ports, but at the same time can be extremely resistant to incoming rounds, even up to .50 BMG. These compound walls can be anywhere from six feet to twelve feet in height and easily conceal the numerous motorcycles that the Taliban used. Motorcycles are essential for the kind of “shoot n’ scoot”maneuver warfare because of the ease of transportation and the possibility of swiftly getting away from lumbering MRAPs and MAT-Vs along twisting narrow roads. In addition, a single PKM machine gun team could be concealed and broken up among three or five motorcycle driving Talibs. One carrying the receiver, another the barrel, another the ammunition. This way, all three could move to a new firing location discreetly, and most importantly separately.

The Taliban’s worst threat was being fixed in place and destroyed. The force knew that it could not sustain a long drawn out, small arms fight even against a single ISAF patrol. Once their position has become known, the key to surviving a protracted fight is to quickly pick up, mount up, and push to another firing position to further engage the patrol, preferably from a completely different angle than the first one. The problems thus presented to the ISAF patrol were twofold. One the one hand, it would be very difficult to determine the source of the fire, especially if it was from a PKM beyond 400-600 meters. And second, even if the Taliban location was found and positive identification was made, the patrol would have to maneuver around to get into a position to return accurate rifle and light machine gun fire, by which time the PKM position would already be broken down, and repositioned at a completely different angle to the patrol. This entire scenario is also not even taking into account the IED threat that complex ambushes would often be initiated with, thereby adding another layer of complexity to the mix of that ISAF patrol maneuvering.

Firing positions themselves are very well thought out. As an example in the title photograph, typically Talib fighters will use a pre-existing “murder hole” or they will create one themselves as the other photograph shows. Using blankets, they will place them underneath the PKM, and then on the base of the murder hole as well. This way, the ground blanket will catch all the spent shells, and the murder hole blanket will prevent the PKM from leaving black residue on the caked mud. When the MG team leaves the position, all they have to do is wrap up the blanket with shells in it, then use the murder hole blanket to conceal the PKM parts in it and the firing position will appear to have been relatively unoccupied even if an ISAF patrol were to literally get to it after a firefight.

And to conclude this analysis, this a Talib fighter wearing a Marine Corps woodland digital utility jacket!

Note- The title photograph of the firing position is actually of Government ALP fighters, and not Taliban fighters. This photograph was used because it does display what the TTPs that the Taliban utilize.

Trijicon RCO Mounted Directly to Taliban AKM

October 2, 2017June 16, 2017 by Miles

Mirwais Afghan published this on his Twitter feed earlier, of the Taliban deputy district chief for the Chaperhar district of Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan. He was recently killed by a U.S. airstrike. His AKM features a Trijicon RCO with what appears to be directly mounted to the receiver cover of the rifle, possibly via a rudimentary method of welding or otherwise non-standard mounting procedure.

Of course, if this is the case, accuracy will most likely suffer greatly because of the severe vibrations of the receiver cover during the course of fire. Maintaining zero will be next to impossible. But was a status piece for a deputy district chief, it will certainly get the point across.

CZ Scorpion in use by Afghan Commandos

October 2, 2017June 3, 2017 by Miles

This photograph appeared very recently on Afghan social media pages, showing two ANA Commandos in desert Tiger Stripe camouflage uniforms and most interestingly a 9x19mm CZ Scorpion submachine gun with corresponding magazine pouches. The submachine gun has a number of accessories mounted to the M1913 Picatinny rails, such as the AN/PEQ-2 ATPIAL at the 12 o’clock position, what appear to be two sets of lights at the 3 o’clock and 9 o’clock positions, and what might be an Aimpoint M62 CCO red dot optic. The entire package was given a decent camouflage application that wasn’t applied to the spare magazines.

Judging from the amount of accessories, the lack of camouflaging spare magazines, and the overall presence of a submachine gun in an environment where it would not be very effective, my initial thoughts are that the ANA Commando who is armed with it, is a commander who is carrying the Scorpion as a status symbol. He isn’t actually engaging Taliban with it on combat patrols, but instead allows the weapon to signify his rank. The follow on question however, should be how it and the spare magazines got to the ANA. It would seem highly doubtful that it came through a U.S. supply line due to resources directed towards the ANA are already limited and at that are usually not afforded to such ineffective submachine guns in the battlefield that the ANA and Taliban often find themselves arranged in.

Commander Shafi’s AKSU

October 2, 2017April 30, 2017 by Miles

Earlier we covered the significance of the AKSU in the hands of Rashid Dustom’s security detail, and especially with one of his favored guards. In this example, we have another case of the AKSU being utilized as a status symbol. These photographs are a memorial to Hazara Commander Shafi who was commemorated and memorialized between 2:30 and 4:30 in the afternoon, Friday, Sombole 5 1395 After Hijra (subsequently after Jummah Prayer that day as well). This would be August 26, 2016 in the Gregorian year. The photo above is advertising that the venue would be in West Kabul along an address on Martyer’s Road. The occasion is that it is the 20 year anniversary of his death in what would appear to be 1996. Very little information is available on the English internet but from the date of his death in 1996, of the year of the Taliban taking over Kabul, this commander was possibly killed while fighting the Taliban. Thus, in a post-OEF setting, it would appear to make sense that Hazaras would be celebrating the life of a famous Hazara who was fighting the ideologically same Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan that exists today.

From the original Dari-

به مناسبت بیستمین سالگرد شهادت

زمان: روز جمعه، ۵ سنبله ۱۳۹۵، ساعت ۲:۳۰ تا ۴:۳۰ بعد از ظهر

مکان: جاده شهید مزاری، گولایی مهتاب قلعه، تالار بهشت زندگی از طرف جمعی از جوانان غرب کابل

Similar with Dustom and Osama bin Laden, the symbolism of the AKSU (note especially the 45 round magazine) with this commander is especially evident through the photograph chosen to represent his life at an anniversary of his death. There might be multiple photographs taken of him but yet this one, with an AKSU was chosen. We don’t know when this was taken, but we are taking a chance that it might be after the Soviet withdraw due to the fact that many of the major players fighting each other in the 1990s were lower level commanders in the 1980s with the exception of such examples of Massoud and Hekmatyar of course. Note that this commander could have just had easily carried an AKMS that fits a similar profile of the AKSU but he didn’t.

FNH SCAR-Hs among the Taliban

October 2, 2017April 22, 2017 by Miles

Although very few in number, several news sources have documented the usage of 7.62x51mm SCAR-Heavy rifles in use by the Taliban in Afghanistan. The most recent documentation we have in the summer of 2016 covered by Lost Weapons on Twitter, in addition to the summer of 2015 as covered by Nathaniel F. on The Firearm Blog. There is a possibility that both of these SCAR-Hs are the same rifle over the course of two years, but we can’t exclude the fact that there may be more. How it got into the hands of the Taliban is possibly by way of the Afghan Commandos who are primarily armed with M4A1s but might have been supplied a SCAR-H by their U.S. Army advisors.

Type 1, 2 Kalashnikovs Spotted

February 21, 2017 by Miles

This photograph recently appeared on the social media account of a Kalashnikov aficionado, showing both a Type 1 and Type 2 Ak47 (not AKM) featured in the photograph. The Type 1 and Type 2 are exceedingly rare today, having been taken over by the much more produced AKM and associated variants across the world.

This was taken in Helmand province, Afghanistan by a contractor based there, probably in the Kajaki district. His testimony to this photograph is as follows-

I took that pic in Helmand Province, Afghanistan while I was there between 2012-2014. We had 7 or 8 Type I’s, 6 of which were issued to local national security force members we were mentoring. There were maybe 5-6 Type II’s including one that I estimated had less than 500 rounds through it (the underside of the trigger and disconnector still had cosmoline on it, and the auto sear and other internal parts still showed 99% blued finish with ZERO signs of wear.

The Type 1 is easily recognizable by the curved trunnion, while the Type 2 is identified by the square depression above the magazine, on the receiver. The Type II is a stamped receiver, while the AKM, Type I and Hungarian AMD65 above them are stamped.

Much Thanks to Buck T. for the input on this post!

Dostum’s Krinks

February 19, 2017 by Miles

The AKS74U “Krinkov” has gained a cult-like following in Afghanistan, dating back to the high status of the carbine in the Mujahideen’s fight against the Soviet Union. Because it was mostly helicopter and armored BMP crews that were issued it, capturing one from a downed helicopter gave tangible evidence to Afghan fighters that they had achieved a battlefield success. In 1981 a Krinkov could be bought for the price of four “Dhushka” heavy machine guns in the gun markets of Dharra Adam Khel.

Today we see the Krinkov alive and well, arming Uzbek General Rashid Dustom’s (now Vice President) security detail. The photographs below are a compilation of instances in which we see Dustom in public with his armed escort, in addition to some photographs of his son at the front with him. The presence of the Krinkov among his security force is both as an effective close range weapon but also is portraying an image of high status and power among all who see him.

Notice the PSD member in suit with the Krinkov, and how he appears in a number of these other photographs. Warlords, Generals, and Government figures in Afghanistan and Iraq usually have a very narrow circle with whom they can trust and depend because of the nature of their work. This circle of trust is especially small when it comes to their security detail, as these members are fully armed and have an intimate knowledge of their client. Many times in the past, assassinations of major figures have come from these men precisely because of that, dating back to ancient times as well. Whomever this man is, Dustom must have much faith in his abilities, in addition to being fully able to trust him.

This photograph is particularly interesting because it shows a modified AkS74u, with Trijicon ACOG, attached flashlight, and what appears to be a picatinny section replacing the handrails.