The term technical as a designation for light improvised fighting vehicles is quite the neologism (a word or term which has entered use relatively recently), which has increasingly entered common vernacular, though not yet fully accepted into mainstream military parlance of professional First World armies. The latter often speak instead of a Non-Standard Tactical Vehicle (NSTV), which quite sufficiently covers what a technical actually is. In this article we’ll examine the etymological origins of the ‘technical’.
USSR
Syrian Civil War Crest Symbology: Comparative Conclusion
In this series we have examined Syrian armed groups from across the entire political spectrum who at one point or another during the war featured a firearm in their official crest. Our goal is to present a statistical overview of the small arms used in this military imagery and to share some interesting information I was able to deduce. You can find the first three parts of this series here, here and here. In this fourth and final part, we will make a comparative overview of all the political affiliations fighting previously focused on throughout the previous posts.
Syrian Civil War Small Arms Symbology: Syrian Democratic Forces in Rojava
In this series we have examined Syrian armed groups from across the entire political spectrum who at one point or another during the war featured a firearm in their official crest. Our goal is to present a statistical overview of the small arms used in this military imagery and to share some interesting information I was able to deduce. You can find the first part of this series here and the second part here, the Opposition and Regime respectively.
Small Arms Crest Symbology: The Syrian Regime
The Syrian Civil War is many things, not least an extremely complex conflict. In this series we examine the imagery used by various groups from across Syria’s political spectrum. In the first part of the series we examined the crests Opposition-affiliated groups and organisations. If you missed the first part of the series you can find it here. In this part we will examine groups affiliated with the Assad Regime and present a statistical overview of the small arms used in their military imagery. You can find the first part of this series here.
Small Arms Symbology of Syrian Opposition Forces (2011-2020)
The Syrian Civil War is an extremely complex conflict, not least in terms of its innumerable state and non-state actors, armed groups, popular militias and foreign contractors. Despite the obvious confusing chaos and dreadful complexity caused by a large number of participants it does offer a representative sample frame for academic research. For any researcher looking for a realistic subset of armed factions and political movements within the wider region, Syria provides an interesting case study. In this exclusive series, I examined Syrian armed groups from across the entire political spectrum who at one point or another during the war featured a firearm in their official crest. My goal is to present a statistical overview of the small arms used in this military imagery, and to share some interesting information I was able to deduct.
The Emblem of the Shiite Muqāwama: The Cold War’s Third Alternative
When designing a new flag or representative banner of any given social group, one of the most important pillars of vexillology (the study of flags) one should keep in mind is clarity. Any serious flag should at least be indicative of what it represents, and how the people brandishing it wish to be perceived by the outside world. A clueless spectator means failure in offering a sufficiently suggestive flag for the group’s representation to the public. A flag is an important attribute for any group, presenting a visual introduction and identification through colors, symbols and objects featured on the banner.
Operation Balak: The IDF’s Star of David on Nazi Rifles
“All is fair in love and war” is an idiom in English that refers to the practice of otherwise questionable actions being considered acceptable under exceptional circumstances. When talking about weaponry in general, one example to illustrate the aforementioned saying would be the direct use of an enemy’s arms of war to forward one’s own agenda. Anti-Communist Afghan Mujahideen fighting their Soviet enemies with Soviet-made weaponry, Islamic State attacking regional adversaries with US M4’s and M16’s or the post-war US government employing former German and Japanese scientists and technologies for their fight against the Red Menace are all examples of this common practice. The Israeli Defense Forces‘ hexagram emblem on Nazi Mauser-manufactured Kar98k carbines is another interesting manifestation of this idiom.
Iranian PPSh-41 Production During the Second World War
In the interwar period, Iran’s military industry was primarily dominated by the German investments. In 1933, with the German support, Iran established a powder plant in Parchin (25 kilometers to the south-west from Tehran). Starting from 1934, Tehran Military Arsenal started assembling Mauser rifles from parts kits imported from the Czechoslovak Republic with only stock being locally made. Later they started manufacturing these rifles in Fritz Werner factory which was another plant built by Germans. There was also an ammunition plant and Krupp artillery shell manufacturing plant established in Sultanabad. In 1940 Germany built a gas mask manufacturing factory near Tehran. A German and Czech joint company called “Nabar” was building a new plant in one of the districts of Tehran that was supposed to make ZB-26 and ZB-50 machine guns.
Besides the above-described investments in small arms and ammunition manufacturing, Germany had large investments in other segments of the Iranian military industry, too. UK and USSR were concerned with such strong German presence which probably was one of the reasons of the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran. Here is an excerpt from the Wikipedia article describing this invasion:
The Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, also known as the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Persia, was the joint invasion of Iran in 1941 during the Second World War by the British Commonwealth and the Soviet Union. The invasion lasted from 25 August to 17 September 1941 and was codenamed Operation Countenance. Its purpose was to secure Iranian oil fields and ensure Allied supply lines (see the Persian Corridor) for the USSR, fighting against Axis forces on the Eastern Front. Though Iran was neutral, the Allies considered Reza Shah to be friendly to Germany, deposed him during the subsequent occupation and replaced him with his young son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
In 1941 Soviet small arms industry was not in its best shape, to say the least. Many plants were evacuated but hadn’t yet settled in new locations and there was a huge demand for new weapons and ammunition in the frontline. The Soviet Union decided to purchase small arms from its ally nations. Particularly, they were planning to buy from Iran 100,000 rifles, 500 LMGs, 400 medium machine guns, and 15 million cartridges. They were especially interested in buying as much of estimated 8,000 Iranian Maxim machine guns that they could.
In 1942, the evacuated Soviet plants were already established in new locations and started working. However, the war has been escalating and there were even more losses of personnel and small arms. The demand for small arms was the all-time high. The Soviet Union officials started to think about sourcing more weapons and equipment from their allies. They were initially planning to buy from Iran the Tehran Arsenal, the unfinished machinegun plant, as well as powder and ammunition plants. Later, they decided not to buy them but place orders in Iranian plants, help to finish the machinegun plant construction, deliver equipment, assign specialists and qualified workers to Iran as well as supply the raw materials necessary to fulfill the Soviet orders. As a result of these negotiations, on January 23, 1943, a contract was signed between the two countries.
According to the contract, by January 1944, the Iranian machine gun factory was supposed to have manufactured 30,000 PPSh SMGs each equipped with six box magazines, spare parts and accessories. They were planning to start the manufacturing process in August 1943 with a production rate of 4,000 PPSh SMGs per month. That rate had to be increased to 6,000 SMGs per month. The #367 plant in Vyatskiye Polyany (today’s Molot Oruzhie) which was the main manufacturer of PPSh SMGs, sent the technical drawings and raw materials necessary for accomplishing the manufacturing plan of first two months (8,000 SMGs and 48,000 magazines). According to the contract, Iran could also make these weapons for their own use both during the war and after its end. The only restriction was that it was forbidden to transfer the technology to third countries.
Despite the terms of the contract, the deadlines were not met and there were continuous delays for multiple different reasons. In 1943, only 214 PPSh SMGs were made in the Iranian plant. 11 from these 214 guns were sent to the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army as presentation guns for high ranking military and political officials. One of the SMGs was presented to Shah of Iran. The PPSh shown in the images of this article was presented to Anastas Mikoyan, the Minister of Foreign Trade of Soviet Union. These guns were hand finished and had multiple unique markings. The models that were supposed to be supplied to the Soviet army had only the crown on top of the receiver with other markings being identical to the Soviet guns.
The production of these Iranian PPShs never met the set deadlines and it is unknown how many of them were supplied to the Soviet Union (various sources have various numbers). Reportedly, Iran made some PPShs for their own needs after the war, but there are no confirmed numbers either. The Iranian PPSh presented to Anastas Mikoyan is kept in the Central Armed Forces Museum of Russian Federation located in Moscow, Russia.
Sources:
Davidov B.V. (December 2005). “PPSH – Made in Iran”. “Mir Oruzhiya” Magazine.